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ABSTRACT 
In this study, we test the tenets put forth by Fairness Theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 
2001). Fairness Theory argues that perceptions of unfairness are formulated through a cognitive 
process that evaluates an event in terms of the presence or absence of injury or harm, the 
commission or omission of discretionary conduct on the part of the entity responsible for the 
injury or harm, and whether or not an ethical or moral standard was violated by such conduct 
(termed “Would,” “Could,” and “Should,” respectively).  In this paper, we examine the role each 
of these elements plays in the assessment of fairness. Across two laboratory studies we show that 
a combination of harm and moral infraction shows the strongest effects on both first- and third-
party justice perceptions, anger, and subsequent behaviors, whereas perceived discretion 
(“Could”) has little effect. Results are interpreted in light of recent research in moral psychology. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the not-so-distant past, the study of organizational justice has been marked by attempts 
to formulate a unifying framework through which to view and understand the wide and varied 
research findings that have accumulated over time.  Indeed, the research literature from the early 
days of justice study was often limited to specific areas.  For example, the early economic 
theories of justice from Blau (1964) and Adams (1965) fueled years of research that applied only 
to what was later termed “distributive justice,” while later theories (e.g., Thibaut & Walker, 
1975) drove the literature towards a singular focus on the fairness of procedures and decision-
making.  Research in the 1980’s and 1990’s turned the focus towards the interpersonal and 
relational aspects of justice perceptions (e.g., Bies & Moag, 1986; Tyler & Lind, 1990; and 
others).  Research in the early 21st century started looking at organizational justice not only by 
type but also broke the construct down by source and level (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & 
Rupp, 2001; Lavelle, Rupp, & Brockner, 2007).  Even contributions to the literature during this 
time that sought to provide an overarching view of the organizational justice construct (e.g., 
Colquitt 2001; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Rupp, Bashshur, & Liao, 2007) still maintained 
the framework of viewing justice as a collection of different pieces – fragmenting the construct 
into types, and breaking those types into facets, categorizing by source, and so on.  This 
compartmentalized approach yielded a great amount of knowledge and contribution to the 
understanding of what organizational justice is, to be sure, but it also left the field with a need to 
take a step back and view justice through a broader, less fragmented lens.   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2-1  Fairness Theory 
Fairness Theory, as put forth by Folger and Cropanzano (1998; 2001), provides a 
mechanism for attaining such a goal.  The theory was proposed in order to generate 
understanding of how justice perceptions are made, and to suggest specific cognitive and 
emotional processes through which any kind of fairness judgment may be formed.  In this way, 
Fairness Theory gives the field a different way to look at justice, one that doesn’t rely on specific 
sources or targets.  
At its core, Fairness Theory suggests that judgments of fairness are driven primarily by 
the assignment of blame, or accountability. The model borrows from research on responsibility 
(Schlenker, 1997) and counterfactual thinking (Roese, 1997) to propose that the assessment of 
the fairness of a situation is made through a series of counterfactual judgments that occur only 
when specific conditions are met. It proposes that there are three necessary elements for a 
circumstance to be considered unfair: injury (harm must be done, called the “would” 
counterfactual), discretionary conduct (the perpetrator of the harm must have acted under his or 
her own volition and control, called the “could” counterfactual), and moral transgression (the 
action of the perpetrator must violate some moral or ethical normative standard, called the 
“should” counterfactual).   
It is argued that individuals make determinations about each of these conditions by 
making a comparison of the current circumstances to some other referential situation.  Often, the 
referent is hypothetical – individuals imagine a circumstance that is different from the current 
circumstance by mentally altering some element of the situation to paint a hypothetical 
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alternative to their current reality.  This mental re-imagining is the basis of counterfactual 
thinking, where one compares reality to “what might have been” (Roese, 1997).   
Thus, according to Fairness Theory, to determine the fairness of a situation, an individual 
engages in would, could, and should counterfactual judgments--evaluating whether harm, 
control, and moral infraction are present by imagining a counterfactual situation and comparing 
that referent to the current reality.  The outcome of this counterfactual analysis is said to 
determine whether unfairness is perceived.   
According to Fairness Theory, all three of these conditions (i.e, an affirmative judgment 
regarding the Would, Could, and Should counterfactual) must be met in order for unfairness to 
be perceived.  That is, unfairness is perceived when harm has occurred, the person responsible 
had control over his or her actions, and those actions violated an ethical standard.  If one or more 
of these conditions is not met, fairness theory suggests that the circumstances will not be 
perceived as unfair.  The original description of the theory also argues that the order of the 
counterfactual processes is fluid and that individuals may begin the cognitive process of 
evaluating fairness with any of the three components, and that if a condition is not met, the 
process ends there.   
Although this process proposed by Folger and Cropanzano has been quite influential on 
subsequent theorizing and empirical research (e.g., PsychINFO shows the original paper that 
posed Fairness Theory having been cited 111 times, and the count in Google Scholar is 250), 
there has been very little empirical research that explicitly tests assumptions made by the model 
(i.e., would, could, and should counterfactuals must be affirmed for an event to be seen as 
unfair). Indeed, we are aware of only five studies which have sought to explore the roles of 
would, could, and should counterfactuals, albeit indirectly. 
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Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002) conducted a laboratory study where both outcome 
favorability (“would” in Fairness Theory terms) and the provision of an explanation (“could” in 
Fairness theory terms) were manipulated. The results showed a two-way interaction between 
outcome favorability and explanation provision on perceptions of distributive and procedural 
justice, with the most injustice perceived in conditions of unfavorable outcomes and no 
explanations. When outcomes were favorable, explanations had little effect.  
Similar results were shown by Shaw, Wild, and Colquitt (2003), who showed meta-
analytically a robust effect of adequate explanations on justice perceptions. Specifically, the lack 
of an explanation (i.e., an affirmation of the Could counterfactual) led to injustice perceptions, 
and the provision of an explanation deemed inadequate (i.e., an affirmation of the Should 
counterfactual) led to even stronger perceptions of injustice than the lack of an explanation at all.   
Gilliland, Groth, Baker, Dew, Polly, and Langdon (2001) conducted three vignette 
studies that manipulated the explanations provided within employment rejection letters. They 
developed would, could, and should reducing explanations and considered their interactive effect 
on both justice perceptions and behavioral intentions. Results indicated a main effect for Would- 
and Could-reducing explanations, with the effects of Should-reducing explanations varying 
across studies. In one study, a three-way interaction between the counterfactuals was found, 
indicating that two explanations reduce injustice perceptions more than one explanation or no 
explanation, but three explanations did not account for any more variance than two explanations.  
 In a similar vein, LaHuis, MacLane, and Schlessman (2007) applied fairness theory to a 
study of job applicants’ likelihood to re-apply for a position after receiving a rejection.  The 
study suggested that applicants’ perceptions of performance on a selection test represented the 
“would” counterfactual, while perceptions of conformity to a standard selection process rule 
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(providing applicants with the opportunity to “perform” during the selection process) represented 
the “should” counterfactual.  These two factors interacted to influence job applicants’ subsequent 
re-application for the position.   
More recent research by Brockner, Fishman, Reb, Goldman, Spiegel, and Garden (2007) 
applied the elements of fairness theory by assessing the impact of procedural fairness 
(operationalized to include both the Could and Should elements) and outcome favorability (the 
Would element) on attributions of responsibility, organizational commitment, and litigious 
intentions.  These authors found further support that activation of the Would counterfactual 
(through low outcome favorability) is critical to fairness assessments.  They also demonstrated 
that the interaction between Would, Could, and Should (with Could and Should operationalized 
as procedural justice) predicted organizational commitment, with attributions of responsibility 
mediating this effect.  These results show that the basis of fairness theory can be extended from 
the theoretical into a truly applied setting. 
In this study, we argue that although the empirical research above has begun a line of 
inquiry into the adequacy of Fairness Theory in explaining the process by which unfairness is 
perceived, these are, at present, indirect tests. First, we seek to test the effects of the Would, 
Could, and Should counterfactuals directly.  Most of the previous studies have focused on 
manipulating explanation provision.  Explanations can serve as a proxy for information about 
discretionary control, but the presence or absence of control itself is not encompassed by the 
presence or absence of an explanation.  Also, the provision of explanations is most relevant for 
the determination of transgressor discretion, and thus only connected to the Could counterfactual.  
We also argue that in order to directly test the tenets of Fairness Theory, in addition to 
focusing on conditions associated with the affirmation of the Could counterfactual (such as the 
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provision or absence of excuses/explanations), exposure to varying levels of the infliction of 
harm (to induce Would counterfactuals) and direct (as opposed to assumed) moral violations on 
the part of the transgressor (to induce Should counterfactuals) should also be studied. Finally, all 
of the studies above considered different facets of justice (i.e., distributive, procedural, or 
interactional justice). As mentioned at the start of this paper, Fairness Theory allows for the 
study of more global perceptions of justice, not necessarily tied to outcomes, procedures, or 
interpersonal treatment. In line with this theme we also seek to explore the role of Would, Could, 
and Should counterfactuals on overall perceptions of justice, an approach advocated for by 
Ambrose and Schminke (2009).  
Thus, in the current study, we seek to directly manipulate harm, accountability, and moral 
violation in order to more completely understand the necessity for Would, Could, and Should 
counterfactuals in overall justice perceptions and reactions. 
2-2 Reactions to Injustice 
 The most primary “reaction” we seek to focus on is anger. Whereas Fairness Theory 
proposes a cognitive model for justice judgment formation, there is also an affective component 
(Barsky, Kaplan, & Beal, 2011; Folger, 2001; Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; Spencer 
& Rupp, 2009).  First, research on counterfactual thinking indicates that the experience of 
negative emotions is most likely to activate the counterfactual thought process (Roese, 1997). 
Second, Fairness Theory points out that simultaneous to the relatively more rational cognitive 
process involved in assessing the fairness of situations, is a much older, evolutionarily grounded 
affective response, which both aids and informs the cognitive process (Folger & Skarlicki, 2008).   
More specifically, Folger (2001) discusses the notion of “moral outrage,” or “deontic 
anger” that results in tandem with the assessment that an injustice has occurred. Deontic models 
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are predicated on the assumption that justice is important to people for reasons beyond self-
interest, and that people are motivated by a sense of duty or moral obligation (Cropanzano, et al., 
2003).  Thus, we expect anger to be among the most immediate affective responses stemming 
from unjust experience. Research largely supports the injustice-anger connection (Barclay, 
Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Rupp & Spencer, 2006; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999), and 
such findings are consistent with the cognitive appraisal model of emotions (Ortony, Clore, & 
Collins, 1998). We also expect the effect on anger to emerge, even after controlling for trait 
negative affectivity (NA, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
A secondary set of reactions on which we seek to directly test the effects of Would, 
Could, and Should counterfactuals involves behavioral reactions. Indeed, decades of research 
evidences the robust effect of justice perceptions on a variety of behavioral outcomes (Colquitt, 
Conlon, Wesson, Porter, Ng, 2001; Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2002). For the current study, we 
chose two types of discretionary workplace behavior, one positive, and one negative, both with a 
strong history in I/O Psychology as being connected with fair treatment at work: organizational 
citizenship behavior (OCB, Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Organ, 1997) and counterproductive 
work behavior (CWB, Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Gruys & Sackett, 2003; Robinson & Bennett, 
1995; Sackett & DeVore, 2001; Skarlicki & Folger,1997). 
Thus, our first set of hypotheses is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: All three counterfactuals proposed by fairness theory (i.e, a) Would, b) 
Could, and c) Should counterfactuals) will contribute to variance in i) fairness 
perceptions, ii) anger, and iii) behavioral reactions (all controlling for NA).   
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Hypothesis 2: The three counterfactuals proposed by fairness theory (Would, Could, and 
Should) will interact with each other in predicting i) justice perceptions, ii) anger, and iii) 
behavioral reactions (controlling for NA) such that perceptions of injustice, anger, and 
negative work behaviors will be higher when all three counterfactuals operate 
simultaneously, to an extent that exceeds the three main effects of the counterfactuals.  
That is, the effect of each counterfactual on the negative outcomes is augmented by the 
presence of the other counterfactuals. 
2-3  Third-Party Justice 
 Another key aspect of Fairness Theory, which further differentiates it from the more 
“segmented” theoretical approaches of the past, is that it applies to both first- and third-party 
justice. That is, other justice perspectives, such as Equity Theory (Adams, 1965), and the 
Relational Model (Tyler & Lind, 1992) largely describe psychological processes inherent to 
individuals' first-person experiences with justice (i.e., how treatment toward an individual 
influences his or her subsequent behaviors). Because Fairness Theory speaks of justice as a 
universal, evolutionarily-based moral virtue, it speaks not only to how people interpret their own 
treatment, but also how they react to the (mis)treatment of others (which the literature now refers 
to as “third-party justice;” Skarlicki & Kulik, 2005; Skarlicki, Ellard, & Kelln, 1998). These 
third-party judgments follow some of the same “rules” as first-person judgments, also showing 
robust effects on emotion and behavior (Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2003; Rupp 
& Bell, 2010; Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010; Spencer & Rupp, 2009). In fact, the deontic perspective 
is often seen as complementing other perspectives because it accounts for justice concerns that 
lie beyond self-interest.      
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For example, both Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986) and Turillo et al. (2002) found 
that individuals did not adhere to a model of strict self-interest when making judgments about the 
fairness of another’s actions.  Specifically, these authors found that people were willing to 
sacrifice their own resources in order to punish an individual whom they observed acting unfairly 
towards others, even without having been the victim of the unfairness.  The argument is made 
that a sense of deonance (i.e., morality induced anger) motivates people to make the situation 
“right,” even if that makes their own circumstances less favorable, at least in terms of material 
outcomes.   
The third-party justice literature provides support for the notion that perceptions of 
unfairness involve the evaluation of circumstances against imaginable alternatives, especially 
those alternatives that maintain an ethical standard, regardless of whether the unfairness is 
experienced directly or merely observed.  To further support this idea that justice is perceived not 
only as it is experienced by oneself but also as it is experienced by others, we propose that our 
hypotheses will apply not only in the case of first-hand experience but also when witnessing 
others' experiences. 
Hypothesis 3: All three counterfactuals proposed by fairness theory (i.e, a) Would, b) 
Could, and c) Should counterfactuals) will contribute to variance in third-party observers’ 
i) fairness perceptions, ii) anger, and iii) behavioral reactions (all controlling for NA).   
 
Hypothesis 4: The three counterfactuals proposed by fairness theory (Would, Could, and 
Should) will interact with each other in predicting third-part observers’ i) justice 
perceptions, ii) anger, and iii) behavioral reactions (controlling for NA) such that 
perceptions of injustice, anger, and negative work behaviors will be higher when all three 
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counterfactuals operate simultaneously, to an extent that exceeds the three main effects of 
the counterfactuals.  That is, the effect of each counterfactual on the negative outcomes is 
augmented by the presence of the other counterfactuals. 
 
We test Hypotheses 1 and 2 in Study 1 and Hypotheses 3 and 4 in Study 2. Study 1 required 
participants to take part in an organizational simulation. Study 2 was a vignette study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 1: FIRST-PERSON INJUSTICE 
3-1 Method 
Participants and procedure.  
Participants were 174 college students from a large Midwestern U.S. university who were 
drawn from an introductory psychology participant pool. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 
31 years (mean age was 19.25 years). The sample was 58.4% White, 27.2% Asian, 6.4% 
Hispanic, 4.0% African American, and 5.0% non-specified. All participants earned partial course 
credit for their participation in the study. In addition, in order to make the organizational 
simulation more realistic to the participants, ten percent of the sample, selected at random, were 
paid the amount of money, in cash, that they were assigned as compensation in the simulation 
exercise ($10). Past research has shown that experimental effects when 10% of participants are 
paid do not significantly differ from experimental effects when all participants are paid 
(Kahneman et al., 1986). Participants were made aware of this procedure before participating and 
were provided information about the payment process in the debriefing forms they were 
provided at the end of the experiment.  
Individual difference measures (trait negative affect and the demographic variables) were 
collected in a single evening session. In the weeks following this session, participants took part 
in the simulation exercise.  Five participants and one confederate were run through the 
simulation at a time. When these six individuals arrived, it was explained that five of them (the 
five actual participants) were arriving for an employee simulation study, and one of them (the 
confederate) was arriving for a supervisor simulation study, which would occur simultaneously.  
At this point the “supervisor” and “employees” were taken to different locations to receive 
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information on their roles. Once the simulation started, the supervisor was put in charge of the 
employees.  
 The supervisor commenced in assigning the employees a data entry task, informing them 
that they would be compensated for their work, and that he or she would be delivering them their 
pay.  In this simulation, harm, discretionary control, and moral violation were experimentally 
manipulated in order to induce Would, Could, and Should counterfactuals, respectively.  
Harm/No Harm Manipulation (“Would”). Participants received either $0 (Harm) or $10 
(No Harm) for the work they completed. 
Discretionary Control: (“Could”). Participants were told either that the Supervisor had 
sole discretion over deciding how much each participant would be paid (Control) or that the 
Supervisor did not make pay decisions but instead used a pre-determined chart to assign pay (No 
Control). 
Moral Violation (“Should”).  Participants’ compensation outcomes either conformed to 
or violated the equity norm that requires that individuals with the same inputs (in this case, level 
of performance on the assigned task) should receive the same output (in this case, the monetary 
payment for their work).  All participants were led to believe that their task performance matched 
that of their fellow participants (i.e., inputs were the same), but in one condition participants 
were informed that their own pay was less than the pay received by the others in the group who 
had performed the same on the task (moral violation).  In another condition, participants believed 
they were paid equally to their fellow participants, who had performed equally to them (no moral 
violation).   
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 Thus, our study constituted a 2 (Would: Harm, No Harm) × 2 (Could: Discretionary 
Control, No Discretionary Control) × 2 (Should: Moral violation, No Moral Violation) between-
subjects factorial design.  
At the end of the simulation, anger, justice perceptions, OCB, CWB, and manipulation 
checks were measured. Appendix 1 contains the measures used in this study. 
Measures. 
Trait negative affectivity. Trait negative affectivity was assessed using the NA subscale 
of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, et al., 1988). This subscale consists 
of 10 emotion words (e.g., “irritable,” “distressed,” “upset.”)  to which participants indicate, 
using a scale ranging from 1, “very slightly or not at all,” to 5, “very much,” the extent to which 
each emotion is generally felt.  Internal consistency for this scale was α =.75. 
 Anger. State anger was measured using the state subscale of the State-Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory (STAXI-2), which was originally developed by Spielberger (1988). This 
scale is composed of 15 items, such as “I am furious,” “I feel irritated,” and “I feel like shouting 
out loud.” Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed with each statement using 
response options ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much so). The internal consistency 
reliability estimate for this scale was α =.91 in the current sample. 
 Justice perceptions.  Justice perceptions were measured using the six-item Perceived 
Organizational Justice measure developed by Ambrose and Schminke (2009), and modified to fit 
the context of our organizational simulation. Three items assess individuals’ personal justice 
experiences (“Overall, I was treated fairly by my supervisor;” “In general, I can count on my 
supervisor;” “In general, the treatment I received was fair”) and three items assessing the fairness 
of the organization generally [“The way things worked in this organization were not fair” 
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(reverse scored); “For the most part, this organization treated its employees fairly;” “Most of the 
people who worked here would say they are often treated unfairly” (reverse scored)]. Individuals 
reported their agreement with each statement on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). The internal consistency reliability estimate for this scale was α =.80 in the 
current sample. 
 Organizational citizenship behavior. OCB was measured using the 11 items comprising 
Williams and Anderson's (1991) measure. The instructions were modified to fit our simulated 
context.  Response options ranged from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely). Sample items 
include “Say something hurtful to the supervisor,”  “Assist the supervisor with his/her work 
(even when not asked).” Higher scores indicate higher levels of participant intention to engage in 
citizenship behaviors. The internal consistency (coefficient alpha) of the OCB in the current 
sample was .86.  
 Counterproductive work behavior. CWB was measured using the 19-item version of the 
Counterproductive Work Behavior Checklist (CWB-C; Spector, Fox, Penney, Bruursema, Goh, 
Kessler, 2006), with the instructions modified to match our simulated context.  Participants were 
asked to indicate, using a scale anchored at 1 (highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely), how likely 
they would engage in the listed behaviors. Higher scores indicate higher levels of their intention 
to engage in counterproductive work behaviors. The internal consistency (coefficient alpha) of 
the CWB measure in the current sample was .91. 
 Manipulation check.   To ensure that our manipulations had their intended effect on 
inducing Would, Could, and Should counterfactuals, participants were asked four manipulation 
check questions: “What was your pay?” (Would, $0, $10), “Your manager...” (Could, chose pay 
his/herself, determined pay using a matrix), “What were the co-workers in your same 
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performance category paid?” (Should, $0, $10), and “Do you think your performance on the data 
entry task was measured accurately?” (Should, yes, no). Individuals responded to these items by 
checking the appropriate choice. Analyses indicated that the accuracy rates for all three 
independent variable manipulations were high (Would= 97.02%, Could=72.95%, 
Should=94.3%). Individuals who did not answer a manipulation check item correctly were 
removed from subsequent analyses. 
3-2 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows means, standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities for all dependent 
variables used in this study. Table 2 provides the cell means and standard deviations for the eight 
conditions, for all four dependent variables. The relative size of these means is consistent with 
the proposed hypotheses. 
Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis 1 predicted main effects of all three independent variables (Would, Could, 
and Should) on anger, justice perceptions, and behavioral reactions (OCB and CWB), even after 
controlling for trait negative affectivity.  
Anger.  Results indicated that the main effect of Would on anger was significant such that 
participants who experienced harm expressed higher anger than those who did not (F (1, 164 ) = 
9.908, p <.05, η2 = .05 ). The main effects of Could (F (1, 164 ) = .104, ns.) and Should (F 
(1 ,164 ) = 2.843, ns. ) on anger were not significant. 
Justice perceptions. Results indicated that the main effect of Would on perceived 
organizational justice was significant such that participants who experienced no harm had higher 
perceived organizational justice than those experiencing harm (F (1 ,164 ) = 39.606, p <.001, η2 
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= .16 ). A main effect of the Should condition was also detected, such that those who did not 
experience a moral violation had higher level of perceived organizational justice than those who 
did (F ( 1,164 ) = 41.410, p <.001, η2 = .16 ). Our analyses revealed no significant main effect 
for the Could condition (F ( 1,164 ) = 3.663, ns. ). 
Behavioral Intentions (OCB, CWB). The main effect of the Would condition on OCB was 
significant such that participants who experienced no harm endorsed higher levels of OCB than 
those who did (F ( 1,164 ) = 28.747, p <.001, η2 = .14 ). However, neither the main effect of the 
Could condition, nor the main effect of the Should condition were found to be statistically 
significant (F ( 1,164 ) = 2.595, ns.; (F ( 1,164 ) = 1.442, ns.; respectively). The results for CWB 
mirrored these findings--a main effect of Would was detected (F ( 1,164 ) = 28.747, p <.001, η2 
= .09 ), yet no significant effects were found for Could (F ( 1,164 ) = 2.595, ns. ) or Should (F 
( 1,164 ) = 1.442, ns. ). 
Interaction effects. Of course these main effects may be qualified with interactions 
between the independent variables. Whereas no three-way interaction was detected between our 
independent variables and any of our dependent variables, two two-way interactions were 
detected. First, we detected a two-way interaction between the Would and Should conditions on 
anger (F ( 1,170 ) = 5.262, p <.05, η2 = .03). The nature of the interaction is depicted in Figure 1. 
As is shown, there are significant mean differences between Would conditions, only when 
participants were simultaneously assigned to the moral violation Should condition. Cell means 
across the Would conditions are not significantly different from one another when a moral 
infraction was not committed.  This suggests that both harm and a moral infraction are necessary 
to catalyze the anger theorized to be inherent to justice evaluations.  
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We detected the same Would-by-Should interaction on OCB (F ( 1,170 ) = 5.745, p <.05, 
η2 = .03). As depicted in Figure 2 the experience of harm only seemed to reduce intentions to 
engage in OCBs when a moral infraction was simultaneously perceived. The effect of harm on 
OCB was not significant when no moral infraction was experienced. This again suggests that 
both harm and perceived immoral behavior, but not actor discretion, are necessary for injustice to 
be perceived, although our inability to detect a Would-by-Should interaction on justice 
perceptions does force us to remain tentative in our conclusions. 
Summary 
As indicated above, our Study 1 results indicated a main effect of harm (Would) on anger, 
justice perceptions, and behavioral intentions, and a main effect of moral violation (Should) on 
justice perceptions only. We did not detect a three-way interaction, but did find Would and 
Should conditions to interact in predicting anger and OCB, but not justice perceptions or CWB. 
At this point we cannot know if our non-significant results are due to the true absence of effects, 
low power, or improper methods.  
Thus, to further test our hypotheses, and to test whether our effects also manifest 
themselves for observers (as opposed to experiencers) of injustice, we conducted a second study. 
Study 2 was similar in design [a 2(Would) x 2(Could) x 2(Should) factorial design], but in this 
case participants "witnessed" situations rather than directly experiencing them. Study 2 
incorporated vignettes rather than an organizational simulation. Although there has been some 
criticism of this method in I/O Psychology research (see Murphy, Herr, Lockhart, & Maguire, 
1986), suggesting that effect sizes may be higher when ‘‘paper people’’ are used, other research 
has suggested that such a method may be useful for some types of research, especially when 
actual applicants or employees cannot be obtained (Murphy & Cleveland, 1991). Indeed, we are 
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not the first to incorporate vignettes into the study of justice (see Colquitt and Chertkoff, 2002; 
Gilliland et al., 2001; Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010).  Although lab research does stand to threaten 
external validity, both of our studies incorporate very realistic situations, and the use of lab 
experimentation in justice research has been well defended in the literature (e.g., van den Bos, 
2001).  
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 2: THIRD-PARTY INJUSTICE 
4-1 Method 
Participants and procedure. 
Participants were the same as in Study 1: 174 college students from a large Midwestern 
U.S. university who were drawn from an introductory psychology participant pool. Participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 31 years (mean age was 19.25 years). The sample was 58.4% White, 
27.2% Asian, 6.4% Hispanic, 4.0% African American, and 5.0% non-specified. All participants 
earned partial course credit for their participation in the study.  
As with Study 1, participants attended an evening session during which they completed 
trait NA and demographic measures. In the weeks following, they attended the experimental 
session.  Participants were asked to read a series of fictional newspaper articles depicting an 
organization's approach to cost-cutting (a highly relevant topic to organizations at the time of the 
research, making the articles very similar to ones seen in real newspapers).  Each article varied in 
terms of three independent variables: the extent to which harm was done to a third party (Would; 
the employees of the fictional organization losing their health benefits or not), the extent to 
which the organization had control over their actions (Could, i.e., it was the company's only 
option vs. there were other options available), and whether or not the action taken involved a 
moral or ethical violation (Should, i.e., the company left employees and their families without 
health coverage by giving no notice and providing no support in finding alternative coverage vs. 
the company “softened the blow” by giving prior notice and providing support in finding 
alternative coverage).  The extent to which these events constituted harm, avoidability, and moral 
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violation was pilot tested successfully among 10 undergraduate laboratory assistants. The 
vignettes are provided in Appendix 3.   
   Upon reading the article assigned to them, participants completed measures of anger, 
justice perceptions, OCB and CWB.    
Measures.       
Measures used to assess NA, state anger, justice perceptions, OCB, and, CWB were the 
same as those used in Study 1. 
Manipulation check.  To ensure that the experimental manipulations properly catalyzed 
the intended counterfactuals, Spencer and Rupp’s (2009) seven-item fairness-related 
counterfactual thinking measure was used (see Appendix 2). Two items asked if harm was done 
(Would). Two items ask if the situation could have been avoided (Could). Three items asked if 
the actor's action violated an ethical or moral code of conduct. Participants were asked to indicate 
their level of agreement to each item by using a scale anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 7 
(strongly agree). To test if the manipulations served their intended purpose, subscale scores were 
computed for Would, Could, and Should, and mean differences were tested on the appropriate 
subscale, across conditions. Result showed that individuals assigned to the harm (Would), 
discretion (Could), and moral violation (Should) conditions showed higher mean scores on the 
corresponding subscale than those assigned to the counter conditions (MHarm=5.29 MNo Harm=4.05, 
F ( 1,196 ) = 25.914, p <.001;  MAvoidability=4.90 MNo avoidability=4.78, F ( 1,196 ) = .268, ns.;   
MMoral Violation=5.63 MNo Moral Violation=3.80, F ( 1,196 ) = 76.011, p <.001). 
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4-2 Results and Discussion 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 provides the means, standard deviations, correlations, and reliabilities for all 
dependent variables used in this study. Table 4 provides the cell means and standard deviations 
for all dependent variables. The relative sizes of these means are consistent with the proposed 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis Tests 
Anger and justice perceptions. The Study 2 analyses failed to detect significant main 
effects on anger for the Would (F ( 1,189 ) = .159, ns. ) , Could (F ( 1,189) = .390, ns. ), or 
Should (F ( 1,189 ) = .357, ns. ) manipulations. However, we did find significant main effects for 
the Would (F ( 1,191 ) = 25.348, p <.001, η2 = .09) and Should (F ( 1,191 ) = 49.656, p <.001, η2 
= .18 ) manipulations, but not the Could manipulation (F ( 1,191 ) = 1.938, ns. ), on perceptions 
of justice. These results were in the expected directions, and similar to the Study 1 effects--
participants detected more injustice when harm was inflicted (except this time on others) and 
when harm was inflicted via a moral infraction. 
 Behavioral intentions (OCB, CWB). Study 2 analyses involving the behavioral intentions 
dependent variables differed from the Study 1 results. For the third-party data, we detected a 
main effect for the Should manipulation on both OCB (F ( 1,192 ) = 4.391, p < .05, η2 = .02)  
and CWB (F ( 1,191 ) = 4.659, p < .05, η2 = .02), but found no significant effect of either the 
Would or Could manipulation on either OCB [F ( 1,192 ) = 2.613, ns; F ( 1,192 ) = .222, ns ] or 
CWB [F ( 1,191 ) = .078, ns.; F ( 1,191 ) = .476, ns. ]. 
 Three-way interaction. A three-way interaction between Would, Could, and Should 
manipulations was detected in the prediction of justice perceptions [F ( 1,194 ) = 11.505, p 
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< .005, η2 = .04]. Figure 3 depicts the nature of this interaction. As is shown, when no moral 
infraction (Should) is perceived, there is only a significant effect of the harm (Would) 
manipulation when the perpetrator's action are viewed as avoidable (Could). However, when a 
moral infraction is perceived, a) justice perceptions are lower than all conditions in which no 
infraction is perceived, and b) the buffering effect of avoidability (Could) is reduced. This would 
suggest that for third-party observations, injustice may be more about ethical violation than 
actual harm and the avoidability of circumstances. This speaks to the third-party "deontic 
response" described in Fairness Theory, as well as concept of moral intuition as described by 
Haidt (2007). We detected neither a significant three-way interaction, nor any two-way 
interactions for either anger or behavioral intentions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 
5-1 Summary 
 
The results of Study 1 suggest that the Would, Could, and Should elements of fairness 
theory differ in terms of their impacts on anger, justice perceptions, and subsequent behavioral 
tendencies.  The strongest effect was seen with the manipulation of harm, while the manipulation 
of discretionary control had no effect.  The manipulation of the morality of the action impacted 
justice perceptions and behavior, and strengthened the effect of a harmful outcome.  In other 
words, a negative outcome results in anger, perceptions of unfairness, and negative behavior 
regardless of whether the entity responsible for the outcome had control over his actions.  
Adding a moral violation to the mix makes things even worse.   
In Study 2, we found that perceived harm to others increased third-party perceptions of 
unfairness, especially when the actions of the entity responsible for the harm were believed to be 
avoidable or the actions violated an ethical standard.  We found that avoidability/control over 
one’s actions was less influential on perceived unfairness when those actions were morally 
questionable.  In fact, the most unfair circumstances in our study were found to be those that 
involved a moral violation, even if the circumstances were thought to be unavoidable.  It would 
seem that in observing the harmful circumstances of others, observers weigh the moral 
implications of the situation more heavily than the outcome or the intentions of the transgressor 
when assessing fairness. 
5-2 Strengths and limitations 
These two studies contribute to a line of research that investigates the premises of 
Fairness Theory and the perceptions of justice.  This research extends the scope of the literature 
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from indirect testing of proxy variables to a direct evaluation of the Fairness Theory tenets.  
These two studies provide evidence of the relative importance of each of the three 
counterfactuals proposed by Fairness Theory, and begins to examine how they interact with each 
other.  This research also demonstrates how the cognitive process proposed by Fairness Theory 
may be different for those experiencing unfair treatment than for those who are observing the 
treatment of others.   
The present research provides a good foundation for testing the cognitive principles 
behind Fairness Theory, but our ability to draw firm conclusions is, admittedly, limited.  
Replicating the study with a larger sample would give us more power to detect effects.  In 
addition, the manipulation check indicated that, while high enough to be considered valid, 
perhaps our manipulation of the Could counterfactual (whether the Supervisor had control over 
his/her decision regarding pay) could have been made stronger or more clear (72.95% answered 
the manipulation check item correctly, which was lower than the approximately 97% and 94% 
for the other two items).   
Indeed, it is difficult to find a realistic situation in which an entity has absolutely no 
discretionary control over his/her actions, especially actions that are morally questionable.  It is 
possible that participants believed the manipulation (that is, they believed that the Supervisor 
was not making the pay decisions him/herself but was using a pre-determined chart) but also 
believed that the morally questionable outcome still could have been avoided somehow.  Perhaps 
the assessment of “Could” is more complex than simply deciding whether the singular entity 
directly responsible for the unfair situation had control over his immediate actions.  For example, 
in study 1, perhaps the assessment of “Could” went beyond assessing the supervisor’s ability to 
assign pay amounts himself versus using a pre-determined formula.  While the manipulation 
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made it clear that the supervisor was not making the pay decision himself, participants knew that 
someone along the line developed the compensation system.  Perhaps the assessment of control 
extended beyond the supervisor and applied to the unknown decision-maker who created the pay 
matrix.  This would suggest that the assignment of accountability can be applied to multiple 
entities simultaneously.  Further exploration of the Could counterfactual, therefore, would likely 
be beneficial.   
As mentioned previously, there are limitations inherent in laboratory studies such as 
these.  Study 1 was a simulation exercise, which took place in a research laboratory setting with 
student research assistants acting as supervisors and employees.  There is some loss of fidelity in 
simulations, and although we tried to mimic the real-life characteristics of a work environment 
by using office-like rooms, requiring participants to do a data-entry task that could be a part of 
many clerical jobs, and providing compensation for their work, there was certainly some loss in 
the strength of our results due to the simulated environment.   
Similarly, in Study 2, we also suffered from a loss of fidelity that is inherent in a lab 
experiment.  Additionally, in that study we asked participants to identify feelings and thoughts 
about a scenario that they knew to be fictional.  In measuring responses such as anger and 
justice, which have such powerful affective elements, there is bound to be some loss in effect 
sizes for those reactions when they are not driven by actual, real-life circumstances.    Future 
research could use surveys or quasi-experimental designs to assess the same variables as in Study 
2 but in a real-world setting. 
5-3 Implications 
This research investigated the components of Fairness Theory.  There have been very few 
attempts in the organizational justice literature to apply the theory, and most of them are indirect 
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tests.  However, an overarching finding seems to be that the Would counterfactual is critical for 
initiating the cognitive process, and the Should counterfactual is the strongest in terms of driving 
perceptions of unfairness.  Our data support these conclusions as well.  An interesting finding of 
our studies, though, was the apparent lack of importance of the “could” variable.  Fairness 
Theory purports that all three elements are critical to the formation of injustice perceptions, but 
our data suggest that control over one’s actions is irrelevant if harm is done, and especially if 
moral indiscretion is committed in addition to the harm.  It didn’t matter to the participants in 
Study 1 that the “supervisor” had no control over the outcome when he paid a low wage to 
someone who deserved more; the action was still perceived as unfair, and they were still angry.  
These findings support the basic premise of Fairness Theory that justice perceptions are driven 
by a counterfactual thought process of assessing accountability, but they raise questions 
regarding the relative importance of each of the three counterfactual elements.  It seems that all 
three elements may not be necessary for injustice to be perceived, especially in the presence of 
unethical behavior. 
The importance of the Should counterfactual in justice perceptions can be interpreted in 
the context of the moral psychology literature.   Haidt (2007) describes the difference between 
moral intuition and moral reasoning.  Moral intuition involves quick, affect-driving evaluations 
about people or their actions.  These processes are made without reason or conscious effort.  
Moral reasoning, on the other hand, is a slower, more controlled thought process that deliberately 
considers information about people and their actions to reach a moral conclusion.  Haidt suggests 
that moral reasoning is a “post-hoc process in which we search for evidence to support our initial 
intuitive reaction” (p. 18).  This distinction in the type of processing that one goes through when 
assessing the actions of another sheds light on a possible explanation for the results in our two 
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studies.  When a moral violation occurs, affect-fueled moral intuition is activated, instantly 
delivering to the observer’s consciousness a positive/negative assessment of the person or the 
behavior.  Participants in the conditions that involved a moral indiscretion may have based their 
assessment of fairness upon this initial reaction, resulting in greater perceptions of unfairness 
than those who did not experience (or witness) a moral violation.  Those participants who were 
not exposed to a moral violation may have used more controlled processing to assess fairness, 
which would explain the increased reliance on information related to the Could counterfactual – 
in the absence of moral intuition, participants looked for other information to assess the fairness 
of the action. 
5-4 Conclusion 
Generally speaking, the results of these studies provide support for the notion that 
injustice typically involves the infliction of harm and some degree of moral violation.  In the 
absence of a moral violation, information regarding the control over ones’ actions helps 
individuals execute controlled reasoning to determine the fairness of those actions, but the effect 
is not as strong.  These findings draw together the literature on organizational justice and 
Fairness Theory, and can be interpreted with a focus on implications for the study of moral 
psychology. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Internal Consistency Reliabilities (Cronbach Alphas) for Study 1 Dependent Variables 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. NA 24.91 4.49 .75     
2. Anger 17.09 5.04 .192* .91    
3. Justice 27.62 10.89 .080 -.370** .92   
4. OCB 51.38 12.53 -.031 -.398** .432** .88  
5. CWB 46.40 22.88 .111 ..434** -.299** -.738** .95 
 
Note. N = 172. Coefficient alphas are listed in bold on the diagonal of the table. Anger = State of anger inventory; POJ = Perceived 
organizational justice; OCB = Organizational citizenship behaviors; CWB: Counterproductive behaviors. 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
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Table 2 
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for all Experimental Conditions (Study 1) 
Outcome 
measures 
Discretionary Control No Discretionary Control 
Moral Violation No Moral Violation Moral Violation No Moral Violation 
Harm No Harm Harm No Harm Harm No Harm Harm No Harm 
1. Anger 
20.80a 
(9.88) 
15.67 
(2.14) 
16.18 
 (1.53) 
15.83 
(2.15) 
18.71a 
(5.01) 
15.68 
(1.20) 
17.41 
 (5.05) 
16.52 
(5.19) 
2. Justice 
17.65 
(5.00) 
26.00p 
(11.72) 
25.05 
(7.99) 
36.74p 
(4.67) 
20.47 
(8.54) 
27.00p 
(11.34) 
26.88 
(11.56) 
37.61p 
(5.81) 
3. OCB 
41.95 
(16.30) 
55.50o 
(8.52) 
48.73 
(11.13) 
55.30o 
(7.89) 
44.65 
(15.62) 
58.00o 
(9.23) 
50.28 
(12.20) 
56.74o 
(10.00) 
4. CWB 
57.20 
(30.75) 
43.22 
(17.66) 
55.45c 
(24.98) 
38.87 
(14.23) 
53.00c 
(27.72) 
36.26 
(15.68) 
47.34 
(23.70) 
40.50 
(16.84) 
 
Note. Means within the same row, with different subscripts are significantly different (p < .05). Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Internal Consistency Reliabilities (Cronbach Alphas) for all Study 2 Dependent 
Variables 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. NA 24.86 4.86 .79     
2. Anger 16.50 2.93 .008 .85    
3. POJ 23.15 9.86 -.036 -.218** .95   
4. OCB 50.68 11.54 -.033 -.351** .449** .86  
5. CWB 46.48 22.20 .108 .362** -.380** -.773** .93 
 
Note. N = 196. Coefficient alphas are listed in bold on the diagonal of the table. Anger = State of anger inventory; POJ = Perceived 
organizational justice; OCB = Organizational citizenship behaviors; CWB: Counterproductive behaviors. 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
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 Table 4 
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for all Experimental Conditions (Study 2)  
Outcome 
measures 
Avoidability No Avoidability 
Moral Violation No Moral Violation Moral Violation No Moral Violation 
Harm No Harm Harm No Harm Harm No Harm Harm No Harm 
1. Anger 
17.00 
(4.53) 
15.83 
(1.93) 
16.22 
(2.03) 
16.40 
(2.71) 
16.88 
(3.18) 
16.73 
(2.57) 
16.15 
(1.59) 
16.68 
(3.88) 
2. POJ 
16.32 
(6.00) 
18.33 
(8.73) 
20.93 
(9.05) 
33.24p 
(7.05) 
16.19 
(5.81) 
24.73 p 
(10.52) 
26.15 
(7.60) 
26.28 
(10.00) 
3. OCB 
48.44 
(11.03) 
48.71 
(9.79) 
50.00 
(10.14) 
56.76o 
(10.85) 
47.11 
(12.19) 
51.82 
(12.39) 
51.67 
(9.02) 
51.24 
(14.18) 
4. CWB 
50.48 
(18.01) 
51.79 
(24.74) 
44.32 
(23.55) 
37.60 
(17.88) 
53.77 
(28.29) 
45.82 
(20.50) 
41.40 
(15.47) 
48.16 
(24.12) 
 
Note. Means within the same row, with different subscripts are significantly different (p < .05). Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses. 
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Figure 1 
The interaction between Harm/No Harm Manipulation (“Would”) and Moral Violation 
(“Should”) predicting Anger. 
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Figure 2 
The interaction between Harm/No Harm Manipulation (“Would”) and Moral Violation 
(“Should”) predicting organizational citizenship behavior. 
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Figure 3 
The interaction between Harm/No Harm Manipulation (“Would”), Discretionary Control 
(“Could”), and Moral Violation (“Should”) predicting perceived organizational justice. 
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 MEASURES 
Negative Affectivity 
 
Read each statement and indicate your response.  Please answer every statement, even if you are not completely sure 
of your response.  
 
1 = never 
2 = rarely 
3 = sometimes 
4 = often 
5 = always 
 
To what extent do you generally feel the following emotions: 
1. _____ DISTRESSED 
2. _____ UPSET 
3. _____ GUILTY 
4. _____ SCARED 
5. _____ HOSTILE 
6. _____ IRRITABLE 
7. _____ ASHAMED 
8. _____ NERVOUS 
9. _____ JITTERY 
10. _____ AFRAID 
Demographics 
 
1. ______ Gender [M (male) or F (female)] 
 
2. ______ Age 
 
3. ______ Race (1=white, 2=black, 3=Hispanic, 4=Asian/pacific islander, 5=Indian, 6=other) 
 
4. ________________ Nationality 
 
5. _____ Highest completed degree (HS= high school, UG=Bachelors Degree, M=Masters degree, PhD= PhD) 
 
6. _____ Job experience (in months) 
 
7. _____ Time in current job, if applicable (in months) 
 
8. Standardized test scores (leave blank if you do not know) 
 
a. _____ ACT 
 
b. _____ SAT 
 
c. _____ GRE verbal 
 
42 
 
d. _____ GRE quantitative 
 
e. _____ TOFEL 
 
f. _____ Other: ___________________ 
 
9. Academic achievement (leave blank if you do not know) 
a. _____ Current GPA 
b. _____ High School GPA 
c. _____ Rank in High School Senior Class 
 
Manipulation Check 
 
1. What was your pay? 
1) $0 
2) $10 
Answer: _____ 
2. Your manager 
 1) chose your pay his/herself 
 2) chose your pay using a pre-determine matrix 
Answer: _____ 
3. What were the co-workers in your same performance category paid? 
 1) the same as you 
 2) more than you 
 3) less than you 
Answer: _____ 
4. Do you think your performance on the data entry task was measured accurately? 
1) Yes 
2) No, I think I did better than the Supervisor said I did 
3) No, I don’t think I did as well as the Supervisor said I did 
Dependent Measures 
1. STAXI Anger (15 items) 
 I am furious 
 I feel irritated 
 I feel angry 
 I feel like yelling at somebody 
 I feel like breaking things 
 I am mad 
 I feel like banging on the table 
 I feel like hitting someone 
 I feel like swearing 
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 I feel annoyed 
 I feel like kicking somebody 
 I feel like cursing out loud 
 I feel like screaming 
 I feel like pounding somebody 
 I feel like shouting out loud 
 
2. Perceived Organizational Justice (6 items including 1 reverse coding item) 
 Overall, I’ve been treated fairly. 
 In general, I could count on the “supervisor” to be fair. 
 In general, the treatment I received here was fair. 
 Usually, the way things worked has not been fair. (Reverse Code) 
 For the most part, I have been treated fairly.   
 Most of the people who participated in this experiment would say they were treated fairly. 
 
3. Organizational Citizenship Behaviors (11 items including 3 reverse coding items) 
 Have above average attendance. 
 Give advance notice when unable to come to work.  
 Take undeserved work breaks. (Reverse Code) 
 Spend a great deal of time spent with personal phone conversations. (Reverse Code) 
 Complain about insignificant things at work.  (Reverse Code) 
 Adhere to informal rules devised to maintain order.  
 Accept added responsibility when the supervisor is absent.  
 Help supervisor when you have a heavy work load. 
 Assist the supervisor with his/her work (even when not asked). 
 Take a personal interest in your supervisor.  
 Pass along work-related information to the supervisor. 
4. Counterproductive Workplace Behaviors (19 items) 
 Take property from work without permission 
 Spend too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working 
 Falsify a receipt to get reimbursed for more money than you spent on business expenses 
 Take an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace 
 Come in late to work without permission 
 Litter your work environment 
 Neglect to follow your boss's instructions 
 Intentionally work slower than you could have worked 
 Discuss confidential company information with an unauthorized person 
 Use an illegal drug or consumed alcohol on the job 
 Put little effort into your work 
 Drag out work in order to get overtime 
 Make fun of the supervisor 
 Say something hurtful to the supervisor 
 Make an judgmental comment to the supervisor about his or her gender, race, etc. 
 Cursed at the supervisor 
 Play a mean prank the supervisor 
 Act rudely toward the supervisor 
 Publicly work embarrass the supervisor 
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL MEASURES USED IN STUDY 2 
Use the following scale to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.  Please do not use 
N/A as a response. 
 
1 Strongly Disagree 
2 Moderately Disagree 
3 Slightly Disagree 
4 Neither Agree/Disagree 
5 Slightly Agree 
6 Moderately Agree 
7 Strongly Agree 
1. It would have been better if the organization in the article had chosen to do something different than they did. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. It would have been better if the employees in the article had been treated differently. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I believe the organization in the article could have treated their employees differently from how they actually did. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I believe the organization in the article could have better controlled how they treated their employees. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I believe the organization in the article should have treated their employees differently from how they did. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I believe the organization in the article should have acted differently. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I believe the organization in the article should have expressed themselves differently. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
45 
 
APPENDIX C: STUDY 2 VIGNETTES 
 
Story 1 (Harm / Avoidability / Moral Violation) 
 
October 1, 2009 
MERITCORE CORP. EMPLOYEES LOSING HEALTH INSURANCE 
Beginning on July 1st, employees of MeritCore Corporation will no longer have 
their company-paid health insurance benefits.  The company cited the current 
economic conditions as a factor in its decision to eliminate health insurance 
coverage for all of its 500 employees.  The cost of providing health 
insurance for employees has become unaffordable, said MeritCore spokesperson 
Pat Anderson, and though there may have been other ways to reduce company 
costs – for example, eliminating bonuses or freezing salaries, MeritCore says 
this was the best option. 
 
“We considered several different options.  There were certainly ways to 
cut costs in other areas, sure.  This was the route we chose to take at 
this time to ensure that MeritCore weathers the economic crisis.” 
 
Employees at each of the company’s three locations were told on Friday that 
their coverage would be terminated on the following Monday, leaving many 
scrambling to find other coverage quickly.  Others faced the prospect of 
going without health insurance altogether, until they could find a way to 
afford it on their own. 
 
“They’ve obviously been thinking about this for a while – they could 
have given us more notice,” says Ronnie Green, who has worked for 
MeritCore for five years.  “I don’t even know how to begin to find 
insurance for my family on my own… it could take months.  Meanwhile, 
we don’t have any coverage.  They should have told us sooner that this 
was going to happen.” 
 
Employee health insurance accounts for about 50% of a company’s personnel 
costs.  Nationwide, about 70% of employers provide health insurance for 
employees. 
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Story 2 (Harm / Avoidability / No Moral Violation) 
 
October 1, 2009 
MERITCORE CORP. EMPLOYEES LOSING HEALTH INSURANCE 
Beginning on July 1st, employees of MeritCore Corporation will no longer have 
their company-paid health insurance benefits.  The company cited the current 
economic conditions as a factor in its decision to eliminate health insurance 
coverage for all of its 500 employees.  The cost of providing health 
insurance for employees has become unaffordable, said MeritCore spokesperson 
Pat Anderson, and though there may have been other ways to reduce company 
costs – for example, eliminating bonuses or freezing salaries, MeritCore says 
this was the best option. 
 
“We considered several different options.  There were certainly ways to 
cut costs in other areas, sure.  This was the route we chose to take at 
this time to ensure that MeritCore weathers the economic crisis.” 
 
Employees at each of the company’s three locations were told in January that 
their employer-sponsored coverage would be ending in June, and MeritCore has 
provided resources to assist employees in finding other coverage for 
themselves and their families, as well as for budgeting their salaries to 
account for the added expense of private coverage.   
 
“They’ve obviously been thinking about this for a while – they did give 
us plenty of notice,” says Ronnie Green, who has worked for MERITCORE for 
five years.  “I didn’t even know how to begin to find insurance for my 
family on my own… it took months.  Thankfully, we won’t end up going 
without coverage.  They told us as soon as they could that this was going 
to happen.” 
 
Employee health insurance accounts for about 50% of a company’s personnel 
costs.  Nationwide, about 70% of employers provide health insurance for 
employees. 
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Story 3 (Harm / No Avoidability / Moral Violation) 
 
October 1, 2009 
MERITCORE CORP. EMPLOYEES LOSING HEALTH INSURANCE 
Beginning on July 1st, employees of MeritCore Corporation will no longer have 
their company-paid health insurance benefits.  The company cited the current 
economic conditions as a factor in its decision to eliminate health insurance 
coverage for all of its 500 employees.  The cost of providing health 
insurance for employees has become unaffordable, said MeritCore spokesperson 
Pat Anderson.  Contractual obligations kept the company from being able to 
consider other options for reducing costs, such as eliminating bonuses or 
freezing salaries. 
 
“We considered several different options, but ultimately because all of 
our major expenses are written into contracts [and therefore not 
available for cutting from the budget], we determined that this decision 
was the only way to ensure that MeritCore Corporation weathers the 
economic crisis.” 
 
Employees at each of the company’s three locations were told on Friday that 
their coverage would be terminated on the following Monday, leaving many 
scrambling to find other coverage quickly.  Others faced the prospect of 
going without health insurance altogether, until they could find a way to 
afford it on their own.  
 
“They’ve obviously been thinking about this for a while – they could have 
given us more notice,” says Ronnie Green, who has worked for MeritCore 
for five years.  “I don’t even know how to begin to find insurance for my 
family on my own… it could take months.  Meanwhile, we don’t have any 
coverage.  They should have told us sooner that this was going to 
happen.” 
 
Employee health insurance accounts for about 50% of a company’s personnel 
costs.  Nationwide, about 70% of employers provide health insurance for 
employees. 
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Story 4 (Harm / No Avoidability / No Moral Violation) 
 
October 1, 2009 
MERITCORE CORP. EMPLOYEES LOSING HEALTH INSURANCE 
Beginning on July 1st, employees of MeritCore Corporation will no longer have 
their company-paid health insurance benefits.  The company cited the current 
economic conditions as a factor in its decision to eliminate health insurance 
coverage for all of its 500 employees.  The cost of providing health 
insurance for employees has become unaffordable, said MeritCore spokesperson 
Pat Anderson.  Contractual obligations kept the company from being able to 
consider other options for reducing costs, such as eliminating bonuses or 
freezing salaries. 
 
“We considered several different options, but ultimately because all of 
our major expenses are written into contracts [and therefore not 
available for cutting from the budget], we determined that this decision 
was the only way to ensure that MeritCore Corporation weathers the 
economic crisis.” 
 
Employees at each of the company’s three locations were told in January that 
their employer-sponsored coverage would be ending in June, and MeritCore has 
provided resources to assist employees in finding other coverage for 
themselves and their families, as well as for budgeting their salaries to 
account for the added expense of private coverage.   
 
“They’ve obviously been thinking about this for a while – they did give 
us plenty of notice,” says Ronnie Green, who has worked for MeritCore for 
five years.  “I didn’t even know how to begin to find insurance for my 
family on my own… it took months.  Thankfully, we won’t end up going 
without coverage.  They told us as soon as they could that this was going 
to happen.” 
 
Employee health insurance accounts for about 50% of a company’s personnel 
costs.  Nationwide, about 70% of employers provide health insurance for 
employees. 
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Story 5 (No Harm / Avoidability / Moral Violation) 
 
October 1, 2009 
MERITCORE CORP. EMPLOYEES WON’T LOSE HEALTH INSURANCE 
Employees of MeritCore Corporation will continue to have their company-paid 
health insurance benefits.  The company had been considering eliminating 
health insurance coverage for all of its 500 active employees, citing the 
current economic conditions.  The cost of providing health insurance for 
employees has become unaffordable, said MeritCore spokesperson Pat Anderson, 
but there may be other ways to reduce company costs – for example, 
eliminating bonuses or freezing salaries. 
 
“We considered several different options, and while we could have chosen 
to cut costs in this area, we determined that cutting employee health 
insurance is not the best option for us.  MeritCore Corporation continues 
to look for other ways to weather the economic crisis.” 
 
MeritCore says they will continue to fund the health insurance benefits for 
its active employees by making drastic cuts to the amount of money it pays to 
its retirees in the form of pension checks.  For many retirees, their pension 
is the only income they receive. 
 
“They’re robbing the retirees to pay their employees,” says 72-year-old 
MeritCore retiree Connor Arnold.  “It ain’t right.” 
 
Employee health insurance accounts for about 50% of a company’s personnel 
costs.  Nationwide, about 70% of employers provide health insurance for 
employees. 
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Story 6 (No Harm / Avoidability / No Moral Violation) 
 
October 1, 2009 
MERITCORE CORP. EMPLOYEES WON’T LOSE HEALTH INSURANCE 
Employees of MeritCore Corporation will continue to have their company-paid 
health insurance benefits.  The company had been considering eliminating 
health insurance coverage for all of its 500 active employees, citing the 
current economic conditions.  The cost of providing health insurance for 
employees has become unaffordable, said MeritCore spokesperson Pat Anderson, 
but there may be other ways to reduce company costs – for example, 
eliminating bonuses or freezing salaries. 
 
“We considered several different options, and while we could have chosen 
to cut costs in this area, we determined that cutting employee health 
insurance is not the best option for us.  MeritCore Corporation continues 
to look for other ways to weather the economic crisis.” 
 
MeritCore says they will continue to fund the health insurance benefits for 
its active employees by tapping into the company’s financial reserves.  The 
reserves are designed to help ease the company’s losses during lean years.   
 
“We’re using the reserves to get through this rough time,” says Anderson.  
“It’s what they’re there for.” 
 
Employee health insurance accounts for about 50% of a company’s personnel 
costs.  Nationwide, about 70% of employers provide health insurance for 
employees. 
 
51 
 
Story 7 (No Harm / No Avoidability / Moral Violation) 
 
October 1, 2009 
MERITCORE CORP. EMPLOYEES WON’T LOSE HEALTH INSURANCE 
Employees of MeritCore Corporation will continue to have their company-paid 
health insurance benefits.  The company had been considering eliminating 
health insurance coverage for all of its 500 active employees, citing the 
current economic conditions.  The cost of providing health insurance for 
employees has become unaffordable, said MeritCore spokesperson Pat Anderson.  
However, contractual obligations kept the company from being able to consider 
eliminating or even reducing health insurance coverage for its employees.   
 
“We considered several different options, but ultimately because health 
insurance is a major expense that is written into the employees’ 
contracts [and therefore not available for cutting from the budget], we 
determined that cutting this benefit is not an option that is available 
to us.  MeritCore Corporation continues to look for other ways to weather 
the economic crisis.” 
 
MeritCore says they will continue to fund the health insurance benefits for 
its active employees by making drastic cuts to the amount of money it pays to 
its retirees in the form of pension checks.  For many retirees, their pension 
is the only income they receive. 
 
“They’re robbing the retirees to pay their employees,” says 72-year-old 
MeritCore retiree Connor Arnold.  “It ain’t right.” 
 
Employee health insurance accounts for about 50% of a company’s personnel 
costs.  Nationwide, about 70% of employers provide health insurance for 
employees. 
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Story 8 (No Harm / No Avoidability / No Moral Violation) 
 
October 1, 2009 
MERITCORE CORP. EMPLOYEES WON’T LOSE HEALTH INSURANCE 
Employees of MeritCore Corporation will continue to have their company-paid 
health insurance benefits.  The company had been considering eliminating 
health insurance coverage for all of its 500 active employees, citing the 
current economic conditions.  The cost of providing health insurance for 
employees has become unaffordable, said MeritCore spokesperson Pat Anderson.  
However, contractual obligations kept the company from being able to consider 
eliminating or even reducing health insurance coverage for its employees.   
 
“We considered several different options, but ultimately because health 
insurance is a major expense that is written into the employees’ 
contracts [and therefore not available for cutting from the budget], we 
determined that cutting this benefit is not an option that is available 
to us.  MeritCore Corporation continues to look for other ways to weather 
the economic crisis.” 
 
MeritCore says they will continue to fund the health insurance benefits for 
its active employees by tapping into the company’s financial reserves.  The 
reserves are designed to help ease the company’s losses during lean years.   
 
“We’re using the reserves to get through this rough time,” says Anderson.  
“It’s what they’re there for.” 
 
Employee health insurance accounts for about 50% of a company’s personnel 
costs.  Nationwide, about 70% of employers provide health insurance for 
employees. 
 
